INTRODUCTION
The fundamental assertion that the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) makes is that investors in a mean-variance world only price market risk. This has been questioned almost from the inception of the model and indeed there is a body of literature that identifies a number of nonmarket risk factors that appear to be priced. In particular, Fama and French 1 find that the nonmarket risk factors size and book-to-market value are statistically significant in explaining the cross-section of equity returns. Interestingly, from the perspective of this study, Chung, Johnson and Schill 2 suggest that these non-market risk factors are in fact proxies for omitted higher moments of asset return distributions.
In a CAPM world investors only care about mean and variance for portfolio returns and covariance for individual asset returns. However, it is well documented in the literature that unconditional asset return distributions are not normal and the mean and variance of returns alone are insufficient to characterise the return distribution completely. 3 In particular, the probability of extreme returns that are observed empirically is greater than the probability of extreme returns under the normal distribution, i.e., empirical distributions are leptokurtotic. These observations have led researchers to investigate the third moment -skewness -and the fourth momentkurtosis -in an effort to explain the cross-section of asset returns. More specifically investigations into higher moment CAPM models have examined the role of systematic skewness, which is the ratio given by the coskewness of an asset return to market skewness, and systematic kurtosis, which is the ratio given by the cokurtosis of an asset return to market kurtosis.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, London International Financial Futures and Options
Exchange (LIFFE) European-style exercise (ESX) index option returns are calculated on a daily basis and examined in risk-return space. Secondly, we investigate the CAPM incorporating systematic moments of higher order than two using options data and we assess whether or not these higher order systematic moment risks might be priced. Using index options data provides an exceptional opportunity to test the extended CAPM model due to the absence of idiosyncratic risk and the nonlinear nature of option payoffs.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section examines the CAPM literature relating to the inclusion of moments of higher order than two. The following sections examine investor preferences for higher moments, the empirical form of the expanded CAPM model, the data used in the study and the method used to calculate option returns, and the empirical findings of the study. The final section contains a summary discussion and concludes the paper.
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE CAPM INCORPORATING HIGHER SYSTEMATIC

MOMENTS
Sharpe, 4 Lintner 5 and Mossin 6 developed the first formulations of the mean-variance capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Early tests of the model were generally supportive (e.g., Black, Jensen and Scholes; 7 Fama and MacBeth 8 ) although there were inconsistencies reported with respect to the slope of the regression line and the intercept term. Banz, 9 however, challenged the validity of the CAPM by showing that firm size explains the cross-sectional variation in average returns better than the CAPM beta. Fama and French 1 show that the size effect may be so significant that it questions the validity of the CAPM in any economically meaningful sense. Furthermore, when they include the ratio of the book value of a firm's common equity to its market value as an explanatory variable in addition to size, they find this so-called value factor is also significant in explaining the cross-sectional variation in returns.
The findings of Fama and French 1 have themselves come under close scrutiny, particularly in relation to their claims that the CAPM beta has no role in explaining cross-sectional variation in returns. Kothari, Shanken and Sloan 10 argue that the findings depend critically on the interpretation of the statistical results in their study. In particular, Fama and French's estimates for the coefficient on beta have high standard errors and are possibly too noisy to invalidate the CAPM. 11 Setting aside these criticisms the general reaction to the Fama and French insights has been for researchers to focus on alternative asset pricing models to the original CAPM.
Equity Markets Tests
Kraus and Litzenberger 12 extend the traditional CAPM to include the effect of systematic skewness on asset pricing and choose to ignore terms of the fourth and higher order on the basis that "aversion to standard deviation and preference for positive skewness are general characteristics of all investors having utility functions displaying the desirable behaviouristic attributes of decreasing marginal utility of wealth and non-increasing absolute risk aversion" whereas general investor attitudes towards higher moments such as kurtosis are not easily determined. The results of their empirical study of equity data support a three moment pricing model. Further they find that investors are averse to variance and prefer positive skewness. related not only to systematic variance but also to systematic skewness and systematic kurtosis.
Dittmar 18 argues that the inclusion of the fourth moment in the asset-pricing model is justified as a necessary condition for standard risk aversion is decreasing absolute prudence and he theoretically links such preferences to an aversion for kurtosis. Like Fang and Lai, 17 Dittmar 18 concludes that the four-moment CAPM prices the cross-section of returns much more effectively that the traditional CAPM and that it outperforms multifactor models.
Harvey and Siddique 19 initially test the traditional CAPM single factor asset-pricing model and conclude that systematic risk as measured by beta fails to explain expected excess returns. They suggest that a possible explanation for this is that if investors are aware of skewness in asset price returns the expected excess returns should include a component attributable to conditional coskewness. Tests on a pricing model incorporating systematic skewness show that this higher moment is indeed significant in explaining expected excess returns.
Future and Option Markets Tests
Christie-David and Chaudhry 20 investigate the contribution of the third and fourth moments in explaining the return-generating process in futures markets. Empirical tests of their four-moment model show that the second, third and fourth systematic moments are all important in explaining futures returns. Furthermore, their results are robust to the use of several different market proxies. From a financial options perspective there appears to be a scarcity of empirical investigations into the validity of the CAPM and extensions thereof using options market data.
THE PRICING OF HIGHER MOMENTS
It is common in financial modelling to assume that the distribution of asset returns is normally distributed thereby allowing mean-variance analysis. In this framework it is assumed that investors are not concerned about moments of higher order than the variance. However, Levy 21 suggests that higher moments should be included in asset pricing models even if they only marginally contribute to describing the return distribution. This may explain why the CAPM has performed relatively poorly in empirical tests.
Given the empirical observations of skewed and fat tailed asset pricing distributions it should follow that investors have preferences about higher moments. Scott and Horvath 22 show that the preference direction is positive (negative) for positive (negative) values of every odd central moment and negative for every even central moment. In other words, investors will have positive preference for skewness and dislike kurtosis.
Chung et al 2 argue that there is no reason to stop with the fourth moment as we are in this study.
After all they point out that investors are concerned with the risk of ruin, for example, and they note that the popularity of lottery type games shows that the right hand tail of return distributions is also important from an investor's perspective. Dittmar, 18 however, argues that moments beyond the fourth are difficult to interpret intuitively and are not explicitly restricted by standard preference theory. In any case, although not theoretically supported, the extension of this study to include moments of higher order than four would be trivial. overcomes this problem by firstly estimating the beta of each asset with respect to a factor in a time-series regression, and secondly using the estimated betas in a cross-sectional regression to estimate the risk premium of the factor. Kan and Zhang 24 note that then the primary question of interest is whether the estimated risk premium associated with a given factor is significantly different from zero, i.e., is the beta risk of a particular factor priced.
METHODOLOGY
A four-moment asset pricing models is outlined below where the term on the left-hand side is the expected realised excess return 25 on asset j and the variables β, γ, and δ, on the right-hand side represent measures of systematic variance, systematic skewness and systematic kurtosis respectively. closer to one. Long put options on the other hand will have delta values that lie between zero and minus one. ITM put options will have negative values closer to minus one whereas OTM put options' delta values will be negative but closer to zero.
To carry out the empirical investigation a two-pass methodology is employed as follows. On any given day we obtain rolling estimates of β , γ , and δ for each option bin 29 using the previously outlined equations (on p.8) and daily data for 120 days prior to the estimation date. These estimates can then be used in daily cross sectional regressions. 30 Results from the daily regressions are then cumulated and tested against priors.
DATA AND CALCULATION OF RETURNS Data
The data is end-of-day FTSE 100 European style exercise option data obtained from LIFFE through their on-line download service for the ten-year period 1992-2001. There are contracts expiring in March, June, September and December plus the two other additional months such that the four nearest calendar months are always available for trading. The options expire on the third Friday of the month and settlement is in cash on the first business day after the last trading day (which is the same as the exercise day). The interval between exercise prices is either 50 or 100 index points, but the Exchange reserves the right to introduce tighter strike intervals (e.g., 25
points). The data was downloaded in text format and contained the following relevant fields: 31 trade date, option type, expiry date, strike price, closing price, instrument settlement price, volume, volatility and closing bid/offer.
The range of strike prices available throughout the data period is illustrated in Figure 1 and it is apparent that many contracts "available" towards the latter end of the data sample are so far from the money that they will not be actively traded.
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Figure 1: Range of Strike Prices
Option Returns
Options are risky assets and therefore under standard asset pricing theory they should earn a return commensurate with their systematic risk. Coval and Shumway 33 show that options which deliver payoffs in bad states of the world will earn lower returns than those that deliver payoffs in good states. One might interpret this as investors foregoing some level of return for the insurance type protection that certain put option positions offer. 34 The calculation of option returns is not a straightforward task like calculating returns on equities for example as the moneyness characteristic of options contracts changes according to movements in the underlying asset.
Therefore, it is necessary to group options into bins based on type, moneyness measure, 35 and time-to-maturity. This process can be carried out in a number of different ways and the following discussion looks at how previous studies of option returns have dealt with this task.
Coval and Shumway 33 in their examination of expected option returns point out that under mild assumptions expected call returns exceed those of the underlying asset whereas expected put returns are below the risk-free rate. Furthermore, they also note that the expected returns on puts and calls are increasing in the strike price (for US Data). The method they employ to calculate index option returns is based on the first bid-ask quote after 9 a.m. Central Standard Time (CST), so as such uses opening prices as opposed to closing prices. They take options that are to expire For the CBOE, Sheikh and Ronn 37 limit their attention to the thirty most actively traded individual equity options to examine patterns of returns. Within this option class they focus daily on the nearest the money, shortest maturity options (but with at least eight days to maturity) with a bid price of at least $1.00. These criteria are imposed to ensure that the most liquid options are examined. On a given day, for each option class, they find the option that satisfies their criteria and take the last bid-ask quote for the option on that day and the subsequent day and use the average of the bid and ask prices to compute the option return. The returns reported are logarithmic returns.
Jones 38 examines the possibility that multiple sources of priced risk appear necessary to explain the expected returns of equity index options. Using S&P 500 index options data and factor analysis he attempts to identify the sources of the priced risk. Option returns are calculated based on holding an option from the close of one trading day to the close of the next trading day. Only options with at least ten days to expiration are considered. Following Coval and Shumway 33 arithmetic returns are calculated using the average of the bid-ask spread.
In our study, option returns are calculated using daily end-of-day data. On every trade date we identify what we term the first nearby 39 and second nearby 40 option contracts as these contracts are the most actively traded contracts on LIFFE. Puts and calls are classified into 5 bins according to a delta-space measure previously outlined. When calculating option returns we use the closing price 41 as reported in the LIFFE data. Option returns are calculated based on holding an option from the close of one trading day to the close of the next trading day. Throughout this paper we report arithmetic returns in decimal format and only examine trade days where observations exist for all bins under consideration, e.g., first nearby contract bins, second nearby contract bins, etc.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The Underlying Asset LIFFE prices the FTSE 100 stock index option as if it was an option on a matched maturity futures contract, hence the term Instrument Settlement Price for the quoted matched maturity futures price. To this end, LIFFE provides matched maturity futures price information with its option price data. However, since there are only four FTSE 100 futures contracts traded on LIFFE (March, June, September, and December) a true matched maturity futures price for a given option may not exist. The exchange, however, provides an implied futures price and since, in practice, only the near-dated futures contract trades heavily 42 this is the contract used to calculate that implied price. This is achieved by adjusting the near-dated, or front-end, futures price using a cost of carry calculation. Information relevant to this calculation, most importantly, a consensus ex-ante assessment of the dividend yield on the index portfolio, is provided by market traders.
Given that we are interested in the covariance, coskewness, and cokurtosis of option returns with the market index it is necessary to examine the characteristics of the FTSE 100 index.
Accordingly, summary statistics including mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis estimates are reported in Table 1 . Furthermore, the results of skewness, excess kurtosis and Jarque-Bera normality tests are reported.
For the FTSE100 index annual mean returns over each of the ten-year period are generally positive with only three years showing negative returns. Negative skewness is prevalent for most years but is generally insignificant. In general there is excess positive kurtosis in the distributions with it being significant in five of the sample years. The Jarque-Bera test for normality rejects normality in half of the years examined. It is clear therefore that over the entire period there is, albeit weak, evidence of skewness in the underlying asset returns. More significantly there is strong statistically significant evidence of excess kurtosis in the underlying asset return distribution over the sample period and that this is the key driver of the nonnormality exhibited.
[INSERT The returns and distribution of returns for the FTSE 100 index over the sample period are illustrated in Figure 2 . An interesting observation is the increased level of volatility in the index returns post 1998. 
FTSE 100 ESX Equity Index Option Returns
Options, just like all other assets, should earn returns commensurate with their risk. Coval and Shumway 33 state "in a Black-Scholes/CAPM asset-pricing framework, call options always have betas that are larger in absolute value than the assets upon which they are written." The opposite should be true for put options, which offer protective insurance to the option holder and will therefore have negative betas. This theoretical perspective is illustrated in Figure 3 . Plots of systematic variance, systematic skewness and systematic kurtosis (not orthogonalised) over the sample period are presented in Figure 5 and further illustrate the behaviour of the systematic moments under consideration. The middle plot suggests that systematic skewness is badly behaved in that it changes sign; it also tends to have a number of extremely large outliers. The other important point of interest is the similarity between the systematic variance and systematic kurtosis plots. The implications of these observations impact on the regression analysis that we carry out later in the paper.
As a final illustration of the results to date Figure 6 contains a subplot of systematic skewness (with a restricted y-axis) to illustrate its behaviour excluding its most extreme observations and a plot of the orthogonalised systematic kurtosis measure presented above as part of Table 3 . From these plots one can observe that systematic skewness seems to be intermittently susceptible to periods of unstable behaviour. More importantly by comparing the plot of the orthogonalised systematic kurtosis measure in the figures below with the previously illustrated systematic variance and systematic kurtosis plots one can see that the orthogonalised systematic kurtosis plot is very different, which is to be expected. In an attempt to summarise the results of the first part of the empirical investigation into the returns generating process for ESX equity index options we plot a risk-return space representation of option returns below where first and second nearby option bin returns are plotted against corresponding average option bin betas (estimated using the equations presented on p.8). It is clear from Figure 7 below (and Table 2 ) that average returns on most option bins are negative. The negativity of OTM option returns is particularly evident and it can be seen that first nearby options in general have more negative returns than their second nearby counterparts.
The fact that the majority of average call option returns are significantly negative is surprising given our expectation that call returns would on average exceed the return on the underlying asset, which in our sample was on average approximately 0.0003 per day 
Two Stage Time Series Cross-Section Regressions
Given the results of the empirical investigation to date the two stage time series cross-sectional regressions we can employ are restricted. In particular, due to lack of stability in the systematic skewness parameter we will not include it in our regression analysis. This limitation is mitigated to a certain extent by the fact that kurtosis seems to be the dominant cause of nonnormality in the market index. Therefore we run regressions using only systematic variance and (orthogonalised) systematic kurtosis estimates in an investigation of how well an extended CAPM works in explaining option returns. Table 4 should be interpreted cautiously -the averaging process used to examine the slope coefficients and their significance affects the results for this traditional approach to testing asset pricing models. For example, on downdays the slope coefficient for calls will be negative while on updays it will be positive. Averaging the coefficients will have obvious implications in the significance tests as the positive coefficients and negative coefficients will tend to cancel each other out.
[
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Pettengill et al 44 account for a conditional relationship between comoments and realised returns.
They point out that if the realised market return is above the risk-free return, betas and returns should be positively related, but where the realised market return is below that of the risk-free asset this relationship will be negative. In order to allow for this they divide their dataset into updays, days on which the realised market returns is above the risk-free return, and downdays, days on which the realised market returns are below the risk-free return. In view of this Table 5 contains results of daily cross sectional regressions for all option bins over the sample period where the data has been split into updays and downdays. As is Table 4 three models are presented and regressions are run for calls alone, puts alone, and calls and puts together.
Applying the above procedure has a dramatic effect on the results. The significance of beta is now very clear in all of the regressions run. It is also of correct sign, positive on updays and negative on downdays. The size of the slope coefficients on updays and downdays are also encouraging as they are of a similar magnitude. There are some significant results with respect to the kurtosis term in Model II but the issue of collinearity is a concern given the effect of its inclusion on the significance of the beta coefficient. This concern also affects our interpretation of the Model III results because even though the kurtosis term is significant in some cases when returns are regressed on it alone the R 2 figures are low in comparison to Models I and II.
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Overall, the results of our empirical analysis are variable. The basic CAPM model performs relatively well in explaining the variation in option returns over the sample period. However, we are unable to make strong inferences for a model including systematic skewness (we discard this variable due to its unstable characteristics) and systematic kurtosis (mixed empirical results and collinearity concerns). Most notably, however, the significance of the intercept term throughout the regression analysis highlights the inability of the models presented to explain the return generating process for ESX index options.
SUMMARY DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper was to carry out an empirical investigation into the returns generating process for LIFFE ESX options over a ten-year sample period. The first contribution of the paper is to provide a risk-return analysis of ESX option contracts. According to classical finance theory, options just like all other assets should earn a return commensurate with their systematic risk as measured by beta. Options theory suggests that call options should on average earn returns greater than that of the asset upon which they are written while put options should earn returns below that of the risk free rate given that investors are willing to pay for their insurancelike properties The empirical results presented in this paper conform with expectations in that call betas exceed that of the underlying and are increasing in strike price whereas put betas are negative and increasing in strike price.
However, the most interesting aspect of the study is in the levels of returns provided by the options examined. Both puts and calls (in almost all cases) exhibit negative daily arithmetic returns on average. This is particularly anomalous with regards to the call returns, which one would expect to have positive returns on average. One conclusion that might be drawn from the analysis is that ESX option contracts are just bad value, i.e., they are overpriced, possibly as a result of the poor liquidity on the LIFFE options exchange. Another factor in this apparent overpricing may be that static buy and hold strategies combined with derivative instruments can achieve the same payoffs as dynamic strategies relying on stocks and bonds. Accordingly,
Gibson and Zimmermann 45 note that in order to enhance the full risk-return spectrum, static strategies require diversification and leverage opportunities which is why investors may be willing to pay above the odds for the diversification and leverage opportunities offered by derivative instruments. The overpricing hypothesis would seem to merit further investigation and an interesting addition to the preceding analysis would be to include options with very short times to maturity, i.e., less than 15 days, which were excluded because of our definitions of first and second nearby option contracts.
The second contribution of the paper is to investigate the possibility that systematic moments of higher order than two might explain the returns generated on ESX option contracts. Systematic skewnesses were observed to be unstable over the sample period and were therefore not suitable for use in this study. This resulted in its removal from the analysis. To investigate the reduced model (second and fourth moments), cross sectional regressions were run across the 1,610 days for which observations existed for all option bins. The most significant result from the regression analysis is the performance of the traditional single-factor CAPM, in that, while explaining approximately 70-85% of the variation in option returns across the sample period the regression results consistently showed a significant intercept term, suggesting that some other factor(s) may need to be included. The role of systematic kurtosis was less clear (its collinearity with covariance affecting the interpretation of results) and the role of systematic skewness was not empirically tested.
Despite the problems encountered in the regression analysis and the mixed incremental performance of the systematic kurtosis term, the role of the extended CAPM in explaining equity index option returns merits further investigation. Developing a different measure/estimation technique might overcome the problem of a lack of stability in the systematic skewness parameter and the orthogonalisation of the systematic kurtosis term can be further explored. Furthermore, an obvious extension of our analysis would be to employ Hansen's 15 generalised method of moments which is distribution free and avoids the errors in variable problem associated with the traditional two stage time series cross sectional approach employed in this paper.
APPENDIX A DATA FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Trading Date Type Expiry
The date to which the information relates.
Identifier as to whether the option is a call or a put.
The 
Volume Closing Bid/Closing Offer
The total number of matched trades on the trading day in question.
The last bid and offer in the marketplace before settlement. 
where s = standard deviation and
Test is the Jarque-Bera test for normality. Nor is where the normality hypothesis is not rejected at the 5% level of significance. RNor is where normality is rejected at the 5% level of significance. As part of the data filtering process we only use days where there is a return observation for all bins. As a result each bin contains 1,729 observations. b The volume figure reported is calculated using bins data prior to filtering for problematic days (each bin contains 1,793 observations). c J-B Test is the Jarque-Bera test for normality. Nor = Fail to reject normality; RNor = Reject normality (at the 5% level of significance) 
The term on the left hand side is the change in the price of the call/put and the term on the right hand side is the change in the level of the FTSE 100 index. Because these regressions are run using absolute movements in the option and the underlying the results are of different scale to the other estimates of systematic variance. d When using higher moments as regressors problems of collinearity arise when estimating the systematic moments. This is particularly evident in the systematic variance and systematic kurtosis estimates. The solution is to orthogonalise the systematic kurtosis estimate with respect to the systematic variance estimate by estimating what might be termed co-excess kurtosis as follows. The slope coefficients reported are means for all of the daily cross-sectional regressions c The t-values are equal to the mean value of the coefficient divided by its standard deviation. This tests whether the coefficient value is significantly different from zero. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively a The kurtosis measure employed in the regressions is the orthogonalised kurtosis estimate described earlier.
b The slope coefficients reported are means for all of the daily cross-sectional regressions c The t-values (in parentheses) are equal to the mean value of the coefficient divided by its standard deviation. This tests whether the coefficient value is significantly different from zero. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
